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I. Introduction
This short Article is a written version of remarks I delivered
as a keynote speech at the October 21–22, 2016 Washington and
Lee University Lara D. Gass Law Review Symposium.1 The 2016
Symposium, I am gratified to say, paid tribute to my scholarship
and that of my longtime colleague, David Millon. Professor
Millon, along with my other corporate law colleague, Christopher
Bruner, also spoke at the conference, as did a number of highly
regarded corporate scholars from other law schools, distinguished
 Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law; Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minneapolis).
1. The Lara D. Gass Symposium is named in honor of Lara Gass, a
member of the Law Class of 2014 who passed away in an automobile accident in
March of 2014. Lara served as Symposium Editor for the Washington and Lee
Law Review, organizing the Law Review’s 2014 symposium focused on the 40th
anniversary of Roe v. Wade.
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judges—including Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware
Supreme Court, and members of the bar—including former
Justice Jack Jacobs. All of these persons have sought over their
careers to improve corporate law and help it better serve the
larger end of justice. They also have greatly influenced my
scholarship.
This piece will briefly touch on two subjects as a way to
reflect on my thirty-one years of corporate law scholarship—so
far!—during thirty years of which David Millon was my esteemed
colleague and frequent collaborator, as well as a true friend. My
scholarship has spanned a broad number of subjects and I will
refer to only a few of them in this Article,2 but I will not purport
to fully capture all of it, summarize it, or offer a detailed
explanation of it. I am grateful for those scholars who attended
the Symposium and engaged my work in their published articles
for this issue of the Law Review, as well as other scholars,
lawyers, and judges who in other venues have responded to my
writing.
First, I will describe what I found when I entered the world
of teaching and corporate law scholarship in the mid-1980s.3 This
is not just a nostalgic walk down memory lane. Rather, this
period was a tumultuous time that profoundly shaped (and still
shapes) legal doctrine, theory, corporate norms and practices, as
well as today’s dynamic scholarship.
Second, I will highlight two areas and themes in corporate
law that have occupied David’s and my collaborative work4 and
one that I have explored in my own individual scholarship;5 and
then I will link a couple of those themes to what interests me now
about corporate law and about that important, complex, and
sometimes infuriating institution: the business corporation.6
2. David Millon’s keynote address and article for this symposium also
elaborate certain themes he and I have explored in our writing. See David
Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections on a Scholarly
Career, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (2017).
3. See infra Part II (describing the 1980s’ hostile corporate takeovers and
subsequent legal developments).
4. See infra Part III (focusing on corporate purpose and corporate officers).
5. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing religious purposes in corporate law).
6. See infra Part IV (urging continued creativity by the Delaware
judiciary in developing corporate law).
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II. My Entry into the World of Corporate Law Scholarship
Several cultural changes accompanied my entry into law
school teaching and scholarship in the mid-1980s, and culture
matters a great deal to how we see things—and also what we see.
First, in moving from being a partner in a Twin Cities law firm
who was actively engaged in a corporate law practice to the
academy, I was struck by how much work one does alone. In
practice, we frequently worked together or at least picked each
other’s brains (sometimes by engaging in that quaint ritual of
“walking down the hall”). David’s arrival the next year filled that
collaborative vacuum, a point I will come back to.
Second, I came not only from a practice culture, I moved from
an upper Midwest, open, recently settled (at least by Virginia
standards), non-hierarchical, Lake Wobegon culture,7 where I
actually drove on Highway 61 and didn’t just listen to Bob
Dylan’s iconic song about it,8 to . . . the South; in other words, to a
setting where, because I was routinely jarred by how things were
done so differently in the day-to-day social sphere, I was ripe as
well for intellectual change. And intellectual change there was in
corporate law, and that was the third cultural change. The
corporation itself, and so also corporate law, was experiencing
enormous upheaval, the key driver of which was the hostile
corporate takeover movement.
Hostile tender offers—in which a determined bidder for a
public company seeks to buy control in the capital markets
notwithstanding target company resistance—had always been
legally possible,9 but they were quite rare due to business norms
until the 1970s and 1980s. Then, when those norms dissolved,
Michael Milken at the daring investment bank of Drexel
Burnham Lambert famously launched the “highly confident
letter” promising the firm could sell “junk bonds”10 to finance
7. See generally GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1985)
(chronicling a young boy’s coming-of-age in the fictitious small town of Lake
Wobegon, Minnesota).
8. BOB DYLAN, HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Capitol Records 1965).
9. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1898 (1989) (explaining that shareholders’ rights to sell to
hostile bidders was “historically unquestioned”).
10. See Junk Bond, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A bond that
pays interest at a high rate because of significant risks—often issued to raise
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what, initially, were highly leveraged purchases.11 Unlike the
Woodstock Festival in 1969—where they say if you remember it
you probably weren’t there—many of us vividly recall how
takeovers unleashed the tumult of the 1980s.
Takeovers were hailed by many as a nifty, free-market
solution to corporate law’s longstanding accountability challenge:
namely, how to make sometimes shirking, self-serving corporate
directors and officers more responsive to shareholders.12 The
solution: subject directors and officers to the harsh discipline of
the capital markets, free of heavy-handed government and
law-centered regulation—an appealing idea in the de-regulatory
1980s when President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher
governed, and when the Berlin Wall came down (and Wall Street
was still glamorized), and the Soviet Union rapidly unraveled,
and with it—supposedly and naively—the permanent triumph of
liberal democracy.13
money quickly in order to buy the shares of another company.”).
11. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert;
Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, Is Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/14/business/collapse-drexelburnham-lambert-drexel-symbol-wall-st-era-dismantlingbankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (describing Michael
Milken’s involvement with junk bonds) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Michael Milken was head of Drexel’s junk bond division during
the 1980s. Id. Under Milken’s leadership, Drexel financed small companies that
placed bids for large corporations using junk bonds. Id. In 1986, the firm began
to collapse and Milken was later convicted of six felonies. Id.
12. The challenge arose from the separation of ownership and management
in the public company as described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their
seminal work. See generally ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
13. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xi
(1992) (“I argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of
liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world
over the past few years . . . .”). Fukuyama’s 1992 book expanded on his 1989
essay, “The End of History?” published in The National Interest. See generally
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INT. 3 (1989) (announcing the
inevitable triumph of liberal capitalist democracy).
A similarly naïve and wrongheaded claim for the “end of history for corporate
law”—i.e., the triumph of the ideology of shareholder primacy in corporate law—
was made by Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in a 2001
article. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). As seen with Mark Twain’s droll
response to reports of his death, the Hansmann-Kraakman assessment, like
that of Fukuyama, was “greatly exaggerated.” See GYLES BRANDRETH, OXFORD
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This lofty view of takeovers received the needed intellectual
endorsement from the University of Chicago’s Law and
Economics movement which, through the work of Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, imported into the legal academy
the insights of financial economics,14 albeit in a highly
reductionist, over-simplified manner that drained humans of
their full humanity and boiled the complex corporate institution
down to a set of contracts (dressed up as a “nexus”) and that
rested as well on a simplistic—and legally inaccurate—
principal-agent conception of corporateness.15 The account also
stumbled badly in failing to consider and account for the growing
political and social backlash to the dreary vision of economic life
it championed.16
Not everyone, it turned out, was convinced of the social
utility of hostile takeovers (think today, for a mild comparison, of
shareholder
activism).
Many
were
concerned
that
notwithstanding
supposed
(but
disputed)
efficiency
considerations, largely based on short term stock event studies,
adverse effects were too often experienced by laid-off or fearful
employees, along with cuts in research and development budgets,
losses to local communities and civic leadership when plants and
offices were shuttered, and over-leveraged balance sheets that
burdened and hobbled companies themselves.
Dissenting voices were heard not just from business leaders
and labor interests, who of course felt imperiled, but also, and
this was very healthy, corporations were discussed as part of a
larger public discourse. For example, novelists such as our own
Tom Wolfe, in his book Bonfire of the Vanities, where he skewers
the mores of ultra-rich Wall Street “Masters of the Universe.”17
DICTIONARY OF HUMOROUS QUOTATIONS 82 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining the origin of
Twain’s famous quote).
14. This intellectual history is well described by Professor David Millon.
See generally David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
1013 (2013).
15. See generally Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in
the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992) (critiquing the nexus
theory).
16. See id. at 2224 (describing the resistance to corporate takeovers by
state legislatures and Delaware’s judges during the 1980s).
17. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 10 (1989). Mr. Wolfe is a
1951 graduate of the college at Washington and Lee University. The book of
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But also, movie makers (remember Wall Street with its
unnerving “greed is good” line),18 theologians,19 and state
legislators weighed in.20 The latter dependably passed antitakeover legislation first struck down by the Supreme Court in
1982,21 but later upheld in far weaker form in 1987 in an opinion
by our alumnus Justice Lewis Powell,22 under the somewhat
misleading rubric of being a form of “shareholder protection.”23
David and I pointed out that, in fact, the emperor had no clothes,
and we called that legislation what it was in one of our Michigan
pieces24—it was anti-takeover legislation, designed to slow down
if not halt takeovers. But takeovers rolled on.
For its part, Congress dithered. It held countless hearings
but took no meaningful action,25 being utterly unsure what to do.
The SEC moved only in quite modest ways.26 Of course, in recent
Ecclesiastes in the Bible famously warns about a human’s lack of ultimate
personal control in its phrase “vanity of vanities; all is vanity,” a key theme in
Mr. Wolfe’s modern portrayal of “vanity.” Ecclesiastes 1:2 (King James).
18. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox).
19. See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 869 n.17 (1990)
[hereinafter Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life] (noting the Church of
England’s exploration of corporate takeovers).
20. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson &
Millon, Missing the Point] (“Rightly or wrongly, state legislators perceive that
hostile takeovers cause lost jobs, destruction of established supplier and
customer relationships, and loss of tax revenues and charitable contributions.”).
21. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (concluding that
Illinois’ anti-takeover legislation was invalid under the Commerce Clause).
22. Former Justice Lewis Powell was a graduate of the college and Law
School at Washington and Lee University.
23. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987)
(upholding Indiana’s anti-takeover legislation). I analyze Justice Powell’s
rhetoric of “investor protection” in my article, Making (Corporate) Law in a
Skeptical World. Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical World,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.161 (1992).
24. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 20, at 848 (“State
takeover laws are anti takeover laws.”).
25. See Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 19, at 868 n.10, 870
n.22 (describing Congressional activity surrounding corporate takeovers).
26. See Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover
Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211, 224 (2007) (“Although the SEC’s
involvement in takeover regulation during this period was extensive and
reached high tide, the SEC arguably failed to meet many of its annunciated
goals.”).
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years Congress and the SEC, for good or bad, have addressed a
host of corporate law subjects such as executive compensation
and director independence, and others,27 but largely from a
reflexive pro-shareholder, anti-management perspective flowing
out of its typically cramped two-party view of corporate relations.
In the 1980s, however, federal actors were largely silent, and
someone had to articulate the ground rules for responding to the
new disruptive socio-legal phenomenon of hostile takeovers, and
that someone was the Delaware judiciary. These judges may not
have asked for that momentous job, but unlike actors at the
federal level, they could not escape it.28
So, in short order we had several landmark decisions. These
included, in 1984, Aronson v. Lewis,29 which clarified the required
procedure for initiating a shareholder derivative action.30 This
decision presaged a dramatic upsurge in such litigation in the
years that followed. In 1985, several important cases were
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court. In Smith v. Van
Gorkom,31 the court elaborated for the first time the director duty
of care.32 In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,33 the court articulated
an intermediate standard for judicially reviewing the adoption of
anti-takeover defensive measures,34 a standard slightly modified
in 1995,35 but enduring to this day. And in Moran v. Household
27. See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 980, 980 nn.34–46 (2014)
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Responsibility] (reviewing Congress’ regulation
of corporate governance through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
28. See Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 19, at 872 (describing the
Delaware judiciary’s role in deciding corporate takeover issues).
29. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
30. See id. at 811 (establishing that the demand requirement “exists at the
threshold” of a shareholder derivative suit and can only be excused if the
plaintiff alleges facts that create reasonable doubt as to the application of the
business judgment rule).
31. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
32. See id. at 872–73 (“[A] director’s duty to exercise an informed business
judgement is in the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of
loyalty.”).
33. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
34. See id. at 954–55 (articulating the standard used by the Delaware
Supreme Court).
35. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371–80 (Del. 1995)
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Int’l Inc.,36 the court upheld a target company board’s initial
adoption of a so-called shareholder rights plan—i.e., a “poison
pill.”37 In 1986, addressing corporate purpose for the first time,
the court required a target company board to maximize the sale
price of the common stock once the board had decided the
breakup of the company was inevitable.38
The tools at hand for this new challenge were quite
traditional: Equity (a part of Western thinking since Aristotle)39
and fiduciary duties. Director duties were recrafted to strike the
proper balance between preserving director prerogative and
enhancing shareholder welfare; a task that continued into the
1990s and beyond. With respect to Revlon,40 that doctrine, now
substantially dwindled in significance,41 continues to be worked

(applying and modifying Unocal).
36. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
37. See id. at 1354–55 (upholding Household’s poison pill plan). A poison
pill is “a defensive measure . . . used to ward off a hostile takeover” Joseph
Grieco, Note, The Ever-Evolving Poison Pill: The Pill in Asset Protection and
Closely-Held Corporation Cases, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 625, 627 (2011). Referred to
as a shareholder rights plan, under a poison pill plan, a corporate board of
directors issues stock purchase rights that permit all shareholders (except the
hostile bidder) to purchase new stock at a discounted rate upon receiving a
hostile takeover bid. Id. The entity attempting to take over the corporation
cannot purchase the new stock. Id. Any such issuance of stock would then dilute
the ownership position of the hostile offeror. Id.
38. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (“The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at
a sale of the company.”). See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca’s The Dwindling of
Revlon, infra note 41, for the subsequent development of the Revlon doctrine.
39. See Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV.
701, 709 (2011) (describing Aristotle’s use of equity as a corrective to injustice).
40. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
41. See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 205–10 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson & Ricca,
Dwindling] (describing the remedial decline of Revlon’s duty of loyalty by
corporate directors through a series of Delaware Supreme Court decisions in the
second decade of the 2000s).
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back into the larger fabric of traditional fiduciary duties42 as
recently seen in C&J Energy43 and Cornerstone.44
The culturally significant and valuable stabilizing role played
by Delaware’s courts during this corporate upheaval—and
today—cannot be overstated, and Delaware’s enormous policy
influence may not be fully appreciated by those outside corporate
law. Their opinions—then and now—comprise the community
campfire we corporate law types gather around to discuss, just as
our constitutional law colleagues do with respect to that other
Supreme Court. Much of my scholarly life has been spent
reading, analyzing, discussing, questioning, and sometimes
criticizing, these rich materials.
III. Collaboration
In mid-1986, I was one year into teaching and struggling to
absorb and write about all of this rapid change in corporate law—
while enjoying the arrival of my second son Darren, who spent a
lot of time in the backpack on my back that summer as I
pondered these issues while playing with my other energetic son,
Nathan (who later graduated from Washington & Lee)—when
David Millon arrived at W&L. David and I are not exactly cut
from the same cultural or ideological bolt of cloth; he is a liberal
progressive with whom I, as a conservative communitarian, have
frequently disagreed on political, social, and law school policy
issues. In other words, for fruitful collaboration, it was a match
made in heaven, and we quickly hit it off, above all, because we
listened to each other, and we often refined—and sometimes
changed—our views after one of our many exchanges. And
42. See Lyman Johnson, The Reconfiguring of Revlon, in CLAIRE A. HILL &
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 263, 279–83 (2016) (arguing that Revlon continues to play a strong
ex ante role in guiding director deal behavior).
43. See C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. Miami, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067–71 (Del.
2014) (clarifying Revlon and concluding the Court of Chancery erred in applying
its standard).
44. See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d
1173, 1177–78 (Del. 2015) (reversing the Court of Chancery’s decision to deny
independent directors’ motion to dismiss and remanding to determine if the
independent directors violated their duty of loyalty).
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David’s intelligence, creativity, deep sense of fair play, easy
manner, superb work ethic, and accessible writing style made
him a delightful colleague.
A. Style
As to working method, we both enjoy in-person, ongoing idea
exchanges. But our collaboration styles reflected our view of work
and business as well, i.e., that people everywhere crave
meaningful work, not just to earn money, but to produce
something of benefit, to enjoy some measure of camaraderie, to
serve others, maybe to express some part of themselves, and to
gain an enlarged sense of human dignity and flourishing through
sustained mutual exertion. This view dovetailed with our ideas
about corporations and corporate law, however unorthodox and
idealistic.
B. Themes of Scholarship
I hope our scholarship speaks for itself, and I am grateful for
those who are engaging it at this symposium and more generally,
but I won’t rehash various pieces or purport to capture the many
themes explored in our work. Instead, I will touch on three
subjects, two of which David and I worked on together and
another of which I delved into alone. I will also try to explain why
these subjects remain important and should continue to be so in
the future, even though none of them occupies an especially
prominent place in American corporate discourse today.
The three subjects are: corporate purpose; corporate law’s
neglect of corporate officers; and the relationship of religious faith
to the corporation and corporate law, the latter being a missing
part of a much larger and very challenging “conversation”—and
let’s hope it truly is a conversation, not a series of one-way
rants—being held outside corporate law about the place of
religious convictions in our society. This subject has grown
disturbingly contentious, particularly as we become more secular
and diverse and divided, and find more and more of our lives
subjected to regulation to which some may object on religious
grounds. Moreover, as different conceptions of responsible
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corporate conduct pointedly clash within corporations, as well as
in other organizational venues, and as numerous sectors of
society struggle to accommodate—and, I hope, genuinely listen to
and not stifle—conflicting views, corporate law scholarship
should play a salutary role in this larger conversation.
1. Corporate Purpose
An ongoing theme for David and me has been to keep in the
spotlight the question—maybe the most important question—of
corporate purpose, and the related question of who exactly in a
political democracy should have “voice” on that question. We have
long argued that, descriptively and historically, corporate law
largely and sensibly has been agnostic on this question,45 a
position we understand is hotly contested by others46 and that,
normatively, a pluralistic approach to this issue—which has
enormous social significance—is to be preferred to an economic
reductionistic view that business corporations are only financial
mechanisms that should have a singular focus, i.e., shareholder
wealth maximization. David and I, along with others—Lynne
Dallas, Lynn Stout, Bill Bratton, Eric Orts, Cheryl Wade, and
others later—were “dissenters” from an emerging orthodoxy in
corporate law theory in the 1980s that a managerial fixation on
shareholder primacy (a term, by the way, that David and I
introduced into corporate law and that does not mean
shareholder “exclusivity”)47 also would advance overall social
welfare and the common good. Maybe, but maybe not.
But one can ask: Why is this even a proper subject for
corporate law? Isn’t this rather the domain of business ethicists

45. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 13 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Hobby Lobby]
(“Delaware law is agnostic on the question of corporate purpose.”).
46. See Leo Strine, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2012)
(expressing skepticism that corporations are motivated by purposes beyond
profit maximization).
47. See Millon, supra note 14, at 1015 (describing the introduction of the
term in early 1989 by Millon and Johnson individually, and then analyzed
jointly in Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 9).
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(who, by the way, overwhelmingly reject shareholder primacy),48
moral philosophers, and business persons themselves? Yes, but it
also is an issue those in corporate law must contend with. We
recognize that corporate law, like all fields of inquiry, requires
boundaries and an organizing paradigm, but for several reasons
we set corporate purpose squarely within those boundaries and
paradigm. A glance at continental Europe reveals that there is no
inevitability to a purely shareholder-centric scheme of corporate
governance.49
There are many reasons for our thinking, but I will briefly
provide just three of them. First, as to the state of positive law,
quite clearly shareholder wealth maximization is not the default
rule in the thirty plus states with constituency statutes, which
permit corporate directors to consider a broad array of
noninvestor interests in making decisions.50 Whatever lawyers
and scholars think of those laws—and I know they are decried as
shameless, toothless rent-seeking legislation—and however little
deployed, they are the law, and I think they comport with widely
shared business practices and social norms. The Supreme Court
acknowledged as much in the Hobby Lobby case.51
As to Delaware, one can squeeze the Revlon and Gheewalla52
opinions like legal lemons,53 but a broad, general shareholder
maximization mandate does not emerge from those special
48. See generally Hasko Von Kriegstein, Shareholder Primacy and
Deontology, 120 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 465 (2015) (critiquing shareholder primacy
model that prioritizes shareholder profit maximization over all other corporate
goals).
49. See generally Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law
Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005).
50. See JAMES COX & THOMAS HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4.10, at 245 (2010) (describing how constituency statutes
authorize directors to consider the interests of “employees, creditors,
bondholders, suppliers, communities, . . . state or national economic[s,] . . . as
well as broader societal interests” when making decisions).
51. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014) (explaining
that a corporation’s business practices “fall comfortably within” the exercise of
religion).
52. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
53. Id.; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986).
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setting cases. Delaware Supreme Court decisional law certainly
supports a director duty to “enhance” monetary goals in order to
“benefit” shareholders,54 but not to “maximize” shareholder
wealth.
Second, empirically, whether the objective of shareholder
wealth maximization is ever achieved by a corporation is simply
unknowable, because ex post the course of conduct actually
chosen can never be compared to those courses not chosen ex
ante. As with the pursuit of the ever elusive and never attained
mirage in the desert, so too the shareholder wealth maximand. It
may be in the nature of a quest, but it is not a measurably
attainable goal. Relatedly, many close businesses do not even try
to focus solely on shareholder wealth; nor, on pluralism grounds,
should we prefer a business monoculture that does so over a more
diverse business ecosystem.
Perhaps public company managers, by way of contrast, truly
are unable to reconcile shareholder demands with societal
expectations for corporate social responsibility in the broader
community, given shareholder voting rights, activist shareholder
and hedge fund pressures for corporate sales, stock buybacks,
higher dividends and debt loads, and management’s own
internalizing of a shareholder primacy norm. If so, such
companies must enlist dependable long-term shareholder allies—
such as passive index funds55—to resist short-term investor
54. Revlon, outside the sale or break-up context, referred only to “benefit
accruing to stockholders,” 506 A.2d at 173, similar to the “benefit of its
shareholder . . . owners” language of Gheewalla. 930 A.2d at 101. The Delaware
Supreme Court in its Paramount v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 2010),
decision, spoke only of “enhancing,” not “maximizing,” and the court stressed
“corporate” profitability, not a share price metric. Id. at 1150.
In a recent article, Professor George Mocsary argues at length that there is a
positive law duty to maximize stockholder wealth, but, like many others who
take that (wrong) position, he cites to no Delaware Supreme Court cases
actually stating that there is such a duty; instead he cites only to decisions
recognizing a director’s duty to pursue “benefit” for stockholders. See George A.
Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1355 (2016)
(“Delaware’s Supreme and Chancery Courts have affirmed that [corporate
directors] . . . have a ‘legal responsibility to manage the business of a
corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.’” (citing. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d at 101)).
55. See Sarah Krouse et al., Passive Funds Embrace Their New Power,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2016 at A1 (describing the increased investment activity in
passive index funds).
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pressures, or I predict they will find themselves more and more
heavily regulated from outside corporate law, a trend we have
witnessed over recent years.56
Finally, and there are other reasons too, it is demeaning to
people who work to suggest that their whole reason for rolling out
of bed every morning is to enrich shareholders. Such a view—
described recently by a former Wells Fargo sales employee as
“soul crushing”57—rings hollow in our society and likely does not
enjoy broad public support, particularly with growing economic
inequality and polarization, and bleak prospects for many young
workers. Of course, wealth must be produced, but humans work
for many reasons. Financial capital, moreover, is not inherently
more important than human capital, and our legal discourse
should preserve human dignity by not reducing work to a
commodity-like “resource,” or a production “input,” or simply a
“means to an end” of shareholder well-being.
2. The Religious Perspective in Corporate Law
This is where my interest in religious faith intersects with
corporate law. But it is also where I am puzzled, religion aside,
that constructive criticism of the corporation and calls for
corporate reform and greater corporate responsibility seem to
come largely from the political left and social progressives.
Conservatives should care deeply about business and legal norms
and practices that relentlessly tear at social groups and that
elevate the individual over the common good while, at the same
time, reducing the individual to a shrewdly calculating,
free-roving, bargain-happy caricature. [This is why David and I
agree on corporate purpose, albeit from very different vantage
points; but I strongly prefer internal self-reform over externally
imposed legal mandates.]
56. See Johnson, Corporate Responsibility, supra note 27, at 980
(discussing congressional regulation of corporations in the early twenty-first
century); supra note 27 and accompanying text (same).
57. See Chris Arnold, Former Wells Fargo Employees Describe Toxic Sales
Culture, Even at HQ, NPR (Oct. 4, 2016, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/
10/04/496508361/former-wells-fargo-employees-describe-toxic-sales-culture-evenat-hq (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (describing a Wells Fargo employee’s experience)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In corporate theory and business practice, too little attention
is given to the role of altruism or to other admirable human
traits, such as compassion, benevolence, and trust, that precede
and permit (and might be damaged by) an ethos of unfettered
self-interest.58 None of these traits or qualities originates in
private bargain, or in positive law, or by dint of government
decree. In fact they can wither when we expect law to do the work
of more empathetic personal and organizational norms.59 Yet, at
the corporate theory level, people are simplistically regarded as
“individuals,” who although individuated from others, are not
conceived of as fully-formed “persons” who, drawing on the
“better angels of their nature,”60 sometimes behave sacrificially as
well as selfishly.61 And this is likely true as well of those humans
who stand behind the institutional investors who hold large
blocks of public company stock.
In contrast, much religious thinking fully acknowledges
human shortcomings such as an undeniable inclination toward
self-centeredness, but regards these as hindrances to be
overcome, not qualities to be passively accepted. In corporate
theory, however, the workings of markets and competition, fueled
by human self-interest and occasionally checked by noncorporate
law rules, supposedly serve as sufficient impersonal (and ironic)
substitutes for empathy and benevolence.
As a result, altruism, sacrifice, and gift—impulses in
abundance throughout human society—simply are not part of the
heavily monetized lexicon of mainstream corporate thought and
business practice. If benevolence is about the “give” in human
dealings, business emphasizes the “get,” creating for many a
profound dissonance between what is valued in life generally and
what is demanded in business. This gnawing sense of alienation
58. See Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 83, 93 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Re-Enchanting] (explaining that
current corporate law theory assumes self-seeking individuals).
59. See id. at 95 (arguing that the role of religious convictions in corporate
life should be addressed by corporate scholars).
60. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
61. This is developed in Rethinking How Business Purpose Is Taught in
Catholic Business Education. See generally Lyman Johnson et al., Rethinking
How Business Purpose Is Taught in Catholic Business Education, 32 J. CATH.
HIGHER EDUC. 59 (2013).
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from one’s deeper set of beliefs leads to a “divided life” where
matters of spirit (“thine”) and finance (“mine”) are said to occupy
wholly separate spheres.62 As Pope John Paul II noted, a
company’s financial accounts may be in good order, and yet
people within the business may be humiliated and have their
dignity offended.63
Corporate theory’s descriptive account, faulty as it is, then
magnifies the problem because it can take on an insidious
prescriptive force with many business persons believing they
should be self-serving.64 Business actors who perceive that senior
management is self-interested and motivated by personal
financial gain may themselves, acting pragmatically, be more
likely to misbehave.65 This outcome flows from social identity
dynamics whereby an individual conforms to group norms and
internalizes the values and behavior that are institutionally
lauded. The result can be entire corporate cultures characterized
by, because they prominently reward, rampant selfaggrandizement. I think we can all identify recent (and past)
examples, and we all know the enormous damage that results.
This quality of human selfishness and the total absence of
grace in corporate interactions is, in corporate theory, assumed a
priori. Yet, there is no legal rule requiring such behavior, and the
empirical reality of self-sacrifice abounds. Corporate theory
should of course take a clear-eyed, realistic account of selfcentered behavior in business matters, while also paying greater
62. See Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 58, at 92 (discussing the
“divided life” as described by scholars Helen Alford and Michael Naughton).
63. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus 1, 28 (May 1, 1991),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.pdf (“It is possible for the financial accounts
to be in order, and yet for the people—who make up the firm’s most valuable
asset—to be humiliated and their dignity offended.”).
64. See Lyman Johnson, Law, Agape, and the Corporation, in AGAPE,
JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? (R. Cochran & Z.
Colao eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (finding that corporate theory
relies on an “impoverished account” of corporate individuals, ignoring human
capacity and desire to “give sacrificially”) (on file with Washington & Lee Law
Review).
65. See Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of
Some Key Research Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 307–11 (2014)
(discussing how “leaders—both high-level executives and lower-level
supervisors—have major influence on ethical behavior”).
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attention to the many counter-examples in the corporate sector
where neither individual nor corporate monetary goals are
paramount, including those companies where religious faith has
played a formative role in business strategy, such as Chick-fil-A,
Service Master, Hobby Lobby, and many other successful
businesses.
Moving from how I think we need a better anthropological
understanding of the individual in corporate law to the
corporation itself as a social institution, courts in the 1980s
wisely sidestepped the issue of corporate purpose and left it
somewhat nebulous.66 Unfortunately, law aside, many in the
corporate business world are now steeped in the language and
norms of a trope-like shareholder primacy, as advocated by many
finance-focused theorists bent on disregarding the corporation as
an institution in its own right.67
Because we have criticized an overly sharp shareholder
primacy focus, David and I appreciate that it is one thing for
corporations, like humans, not to be sick, but another matter to
make them well. Here, my own recent thinking is this: The
predominant corporate law paradigm today, ironically, has little
to say about the corporation, the Latin root of which means
“body,” and corporate “bodies” have many parts which form one
unit. The corporate body today, however, is essentially ignored in
favor of focusing exclusively on shareholders and directors. This
is unfortunate, and it is a subject I intend to keep working on. We
should take the corporation seriously and reclaim it as a subject
of study for corporate law. It is not just a distinct legal “person”
today,68 it is a pervasive, powerful, rights bearing, socio-economic
66. See Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 19, at 923
(summarizing the Delaware judiciary’s position on corporate purpose as “vague
and unknowable”).
67. For example, a 2011 Brookings Institute study noted that the top
twenty law schools and top twenty business schools in the United States
routinely teach that maximizing shareholder wealth is (and should be) the
primary purpose of the corporation. Darrell M. West, The Purpose of the
Corporation in Business and Law School Curricula, BROOKINGS INST. 17–18
(2011), https://www.brookings. edu/research/the-purpose-of-the-corporation-inbusiness-and-law-school-curricula/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See Johnson & Millon, Hobby Lobby, supra note 45, at 1 (noting that
corporations were persons for the purposes of Religious Freedom Restoration
Act).
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institution and political actor, with responsibilities to the larger
society in which it operates, quite apart from the natural persons
associated with it.69 Just as human persons are expected to do
more than comply with the minimal demands of law to be
regarded as “responsible” persons, so too for corporate persons.
Boards of directors should direct corporate business and affairs
accordingly.
Thus, corporate purpose is simply the particular institutional
objective(s) sought to be achieved by cooperative human endeavor
through the corporate entity. Corporations, like other social
groups such as universities, teams, unions, and clubs, thus can
have commitments at the collective level that are not necessarily
equivalent to those of its associated persons. And corporations
take actions that, both philosophically and legally, “cannot be
directly ascribed to the individual members.”70 These distinctive
corporate commitments to overarching corporate goals support
recognition of the corporation as a distinctive person, to which
directors owe fiduciary duties.
It would be exceedingly helpful, of course, if as a matter of
positive law a clear and capacious default rule as to purpose was
specified, or if business corporations were required to explicitly
state what their purpose is, so as to provide all associated persons
with greater clarity concerning the precise goal of their combined
contributions and give them a shared understanding of
institutional identity. Hedge funds and Chick-fil-A should not be
assumed to be pursuing the same goals.
On this point stakeholder-oriented theories of the corporation
err as surely as do pure stockholder primacy theories. Both
theories, in opposite directions, focus on the corporation existing
to serve one or more constituencies and ignore the overarching
organizational mission to which those constituencies contribute
and from which they benefit but which is distinct from their own
individual goals and interests.

69. See id. at 31 (concluding that corporations can exercise a variety of
functions and purposes after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).
70. Kendy M. Hess, The Free Will of Corporations (and Other Collectives),
168 PHIL. STUD. 241, 243 (2014).
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3. Corporate Officers
Let me say just a few words about a more mundane subject,
corporate officers—beyond noting corporate law’s stunning
neglect of them.71 Although corporate officers frequently are the
chief cause of corporate mischief and worse,72 they receive little
attention in corporate law (unlike in federal securities law),
probably because boards of directors typically settle up with them
on their way out the door.
As a result, certain issues remain unsettled and need
clarifying: For example,
a) What exactly, theoretically, are corporate officers?
David and I have written of them as agents of the
corporation,73 and Rob Ricca and I have explored various aspects
of officer duties.74 But if they are agents, do they owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders? Why—if they are agents of the
corporation, and not agents of shareholders? What exactly is the
nature of their relationship to shareholders? Can shareholders
bring a direct claim against officers?
b) And of course, as Delaware has yet to decide the standard
of care applicable to officers. Is it gross negligence or ordinary
negligence?
c) Finally, does the Business Judgment Rule apply to
officers? How?75

71. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1105 (2009) (“Corporate law’s
treatment of officers is like the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody
does anything about it.”).
72. See id. at 1105–06 (discussing the disastrous leadership of business
executives at Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom).
73. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) (“The thesis of this
Article is that corporate officers are fiduciaries because they are agents.”).
74. See Dwindling, supra note 41, at 170–71 (discussing three unresolved
questions relating to officer duties in corporations).
75. See, e.g., Palmer v. Reali, No. 15-994-SLR, 2016 WL 5662008, at *8 n.8
(D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (“Defendants have cited to no cases where a Delaware
court has held that the business judgment rule applies to corporate officers;
therefore, the court will not address the business judgment rule . . . .”).
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I have argued that the business judgment rule should not be
applied to officers, or at least not as broadly as applied to
directors,76 a position some agree with77 and others dispute.78 The
Delaware Supreme Court, in a careful 2009 opinion by Justice
Jack Jacobs, left the issue undecided.79 This too is a topic I plan
to keep working on.
IV. Conclusion
David and I have been allies in trying to keep a conversation
going in corporate law that many, prematurely, wanted to end.
We found common ground, but arrived there from different
directions. The purpose of corporate endeavor should be a subject
of ongoing discussion, not just in our larger society, but in
corporate law itself.
David and I have long anticipated that the tide would turn
our way. I think within the scholarly community it may be
turning somewhat. I hope too that the Delaware judiciary will do
today what it wisely did in the 1980s—stay its hand and let the
subject of purpose keep percolating.80 This approach certainly is
not easy with a relentless shareholder activism bound by no
recognized duties to the corporation and facing no larger,
compelling counter vision to resist it. Delaware’s courts should
76. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (“This Article argues that the business
judgment rule—a cornerstone concept in corporate law—does not and should not
be extended to corporate officers in the same broad manner in which it is
applied to directors.”).
77. See generally Deborah DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 813 (2017) (agreeing that corporate officers’ duty should rest in
agency law and that officers should not be protected by the business judgement
rule).
78. See Lawrence Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW.
865, 866 (2005) (arguing that rejecting the application of the business judgment
rule to corporate officers “is contrary to both established law and sound policy”).
79. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are the same for directors and officers,
but refraining from analyzing the defendant officers’ conduct under the business
judgement rule).
80. See supra Part II (discussing the significant, stabilizing role played by
the Delaware judiciary during the corporate turmoil of the 1980s).
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permit further democratic grappling on this subject and await the
development of the good work of many young scholars in the field.
Without David’s collaboration, my own work on these
matters would be far less, both in output and quality. But this
collaborative process itself showed me the appeal and importance
of humane, shared, dignifying work at a place (W&L) that long
valued individual effort as supportive of its own larger
institutional “corporate” goal of educating for the future.
Getting up to go do work one enjoys in a supportive setting
where one’s efforts are valued is not something, regrettably, that
everyone—maybe very many people—will experience. But for
those with influence over work and corporations, and how we talk
about them, including corporate law scholars, lawyers, and
judges, it is worth aiming for others; and, if we find it, being
grateful for it, as I am.

